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Abstract
English law is settled in its view that Sports Governing Bodies (“SGBs”) are not amenable to judicial review, following the 
Court of Appeal decision in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan. However, this article argues 
that, 27 years on from the leading decision, the issue merits reconsideration owing to flaws in judicial reasoning and, in 
particular, the subsequent growth of the government’s involvement in sport. Moreover, the availability of judicial review 
in other jurisdictions and against other self-regulatory organisations suggests that the position of SGBs in English law is 
anomalous. Since Aga Khan, the courts have developed a private law “supervisory jurisdiction” which somewhat accounts 
for the absence of judicial review but, building on the work of Michael Beloff QC (among others), this article considers the 
substantive and procedural limitations of private law in challenging SGBs, finding that judicial review may be a preferable 
forum for sporting litigants. The paper also provides the opportunity to reflect upon the nature of the public–private divide 
in English law today.
Keywords Judicial review · Sports governing bodies · Supervisory jurisdiction · Public law · Sports litigation
1 Introduction
The past 30 years have seen a vast evolution in the world 
of sport. Significant investment, both public and private, 
has caused the industry to flourish, and there is increasingly 
more at stake for all those involved: athletes, clubs, agents, 
sponsors and fans—not to mention the State. In 1997, Ebs-
worth J commented that “sport today is big business”1; but 
if it was big then, it is prodigious now. Sport is a booming 
industry and a central part of modern life. It is “part of our 
national identity”.2
With so much riding on every match, race or tournament, 
it is vital that there is good governance within each sport. 
This is the job of Sports Governing Bodies (“SGBs”) at 
national and international level—for example, in England, 
the Football Association (FA) or the Rugby Football Union 
(RFU). These incorporated associations have a monopoly 
in their sporting market,3 with extensive regulatory powers 
enabling them to exclusively determine and apply the rules 
affecting athletes, coaches, clubs, agents (collectively “par-
ticipants”) and even supporters. The propriety of these com-
petences is not in doubt, but, given the industry’s growth, the 
need for accountability is greater than ever.
This paper will focus on the use of judicial review (“JR”)4 
as a way of challenging SGB decisions and rules, to achieve 
legal accountability. English law is settled in its view that 
SGBs are not amenable to JR following the Court of Appeal 
(“CA”) decision in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey 
Club, ex p Aga Khan5 but, as Beloff et al. suggest, “it is 
not clear that the last word has been said on the subject”.6 
This paper will argue that, 27 years on from the leading 
decision, the issue merits reconsideration owing to flaws in 
judicial reasoning and, in particular, the subsequent growth 
of the government’s involvement in sport. Moreover, the 
availability of JR in other jurisdictions and against other 
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self-regulatory organisations suggests that the position of 
SGBs in English law is anomalous.
Since Aga Khan, the courts have developed a private law 
“supervisory jurisdiction” which somewhat accounts for the 
absence of JR, but, as it will be argued, private law remedies 
suffer from substantive and, particularly, procedural limita-
tions, such that JR may be a preferable forum for sporting 
litigants. The standing requirements and hearing process of 
JR give it particular appeal in the sports context, and it can 
be seen as a more efficient alternative to private law actions. 
The approach of New Zealand, allowing challenges to SGBs 
in public or private law,7 should be followed.
In Finnigan v NZRFU, Cooke J, as he then was, con-
sidered that SGBs fall into a “special area where…a sharp 
boundary between public and private law cannot realisti-
cally be drawn”8 and, ultimately, it is this fundamental issue 
which has made this area of law so fraught with controversy. 
Though this paper does not aim to assess the propriety of a 
divide between public and private law, which an orthodox 
view of English law would prescribe,9 the analysis under-
taken herein allows conclusions to be drawn about the softer 
nature of that divide today.
2  The state of play
Whether a body may be subject to JR is a question which has 
troubled courts for decades. Determining the precise scope 
of JR is incredibly difficult, and it can only be inferred from 
“the catalogue of the borderline cases”.10
Various criteria for determining amenability have 
emerged over the past 100  years, with the traditional 
approach being the “source of power” test.11 Under this for-
mula, if the power to make the decision in question was 
derived from statute or the Royal Prerogative, it would be 
amenable to JR but, if the power was rooted in contract, it 
would be excluded from public law.12 However, the law in 
this area has developed such that it is now proper to speak 
of a “public function” test.13
2.1  The public function test
The potential scope of JR was extended in R v Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex p Datafin,14 in which Lloyd LJ 
held:
I do not agree that the source of the power is the sole 
test whether a body is subject to judicial review…the 
source of the power will often, perhaps usually, be 
decisive. If the source of power is a statute, or sub-
ordinate legislation under a statute, then clearly the 
body in question will be subject to judicial review. If, 
at the other end of the scale, the source of power is 
contractual, as in the case of private arbitration, then 
clearly the arbitrator is not subject to judicial review…
But in between these extremes there is an area in which 
it is helpful to look not just at the source of the power 
but at the nature of the power. If the body in question 
is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise of 
its functions have public law consequences, then that 
may…be sufficient to bring the body within the reach 
of judicial review.15
This decision led to the emergence of the public function 
test, which has since been formally adopted into the Civil 
Procedure Rules (“CPR”).16 As such, a claim for JR can 
only be brought in respect of an enactment, a decision, an 
action or a failure to act relating to the exercise of a “public 
function”.17
The precise meaning of this term has been the subject 
of much deliberation, and there remains some uncertainty. 
In Datafin itself, Sir John Donaldson MR spoke simply of 
a “public element, which can take many forms”,18 while in 
the more recent case of Hampshire County Council v Beer 
t/a Hammer Trout Farm,19 Dyson LJ spoke of the need for 
sufficient public “flavour” to bring a body’s decision within 
the reach of public law.20 This criterion is “very broad, not 
to say question-begging”,21 but there is a growing body of 
case law from which principles can be extracted.22
In Beer, the CA held that a decision of Hampshire Farm-
ers Markets Limited, a private company, had sufficient pub-
lic flavour in order to be amenable to JR, largely owing to its 
close relationship with Hampshire County Council and the 
7 Armstrong (2008).
8 [1985] 2 NZLR 159, 179.
9 E.g. Woolf (1986).
10 Wade and Forsyth (2014), p. 532.
11 E.g. Law v National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 1 WLR 1302; 
CCSU v Minister for Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374.
12 Hampshire County Council v Beer t/a Hammer Trout Farm [2004] 
1 WLR 233 [12].
13 R (Holmcroft) v FCA and Barclays [2018] EWCA Civ 2093 [40]; 
Williams (2017b), 15–26.
14 [1987] QB 815.
15 Ibid. 847.
16 Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2000 (SI 2000/2002).
17 Civil Procedure Rules Rule 54.1(2)(a)(ii).
18 Datafin, 838.
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fact that it was regulating access to a public market. Simi-
larly, the International Stock Exchange of the United King-
dom (“UK”) and the Republic of Ireland (a limited com-
pany) was held amenable to JR owing to its wider “public” 
role.23
In Datafin, the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers was 
found to be susceptible to JR. The panel was a self-regulat-
ing body in charge of enforcing the City Code on Take-overs 
and Mergers, with no statutory, prerogative or common law 
powers. The court noted the panel’s immense power and 
thought the fact it was not a statutory body was a “com-
plete anomaly”24 explicable only as an accident of history. 
It was also key that the government had “incorporated the 
panel into its own regulatory network”25 and that private law 
control would be ineffective.26 Therefore, though Sir John 
Donaldson MR suggested that amenability depends simply 
on finding a “public element”, the reasoning in the cases 
suggests a narrower approach27—there will only be a public 
function where certain “public” features can be identified.
Yet there may also be uncertainty about what “public-
ness” is. As Hoffman LJ stated in Aga Khan, in line with 
previous authorities,28 public law and public interest are not 
the same thing:
Private power may affect the public interest…But that 
does not subject it to the rules of public law.29
The court in Aga Khan considered that, to be amenable to 
JR, the power must be “governmental”.30 It may be that this 
interpretation is too narrow,31 but, for the purposes of this 
paper, it suffices that “public” means “governmental”.
Therefore, it follows from the CPR and an established 
body of case law that the modern test for amenability to JR is 
one of the public functions. Though the source of the power 
may be relevant, the existence of a contractual relationship 
is not necessarily inconsistent with JR,32 provided that the 
rights asserted are not purely contractual.33
2.2  The position of SGBs
Traditionally, SGBs have fallen outside the scope of JR, fol-
lowing the CA decision in Law v National Greyhound Rac-
ing Club.34 Primarily, this was justified on the basis that the 
source of the SGB’s power was contractual and the appropri-
ate remedy was, therefore, in private law. This approach was 
applied by the courts in, inter alia, R v Football Association 
of Wales, ex p Flint Town United FC35 and R v Football 
Association, ex p Football League.36
However, the issue returned to the CA in Aga Khan, 
where the applicant sought to challenge a decision by the 
disciplinary committee of the Jockey Club (an SGB) to dis-
qualify his horse for failing a drugs test. Notwithstanding the 
functional shift instigated by Datafin, the position in Law 
was upheld and JR denied. Hoffman LJ, as he then was, held 
that the SGB operated “entirely in the private sector and its 
activities are governed by private law”.37
While he made clear that private clubs are capable of 
also exercising public powers, he found that “there is no 
public source for any of [the Jockey Club’s] powers”.38 The 
court heavily emphasised the existence of a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties and noted that the applicant 
would likely have a remedy in private law.39 Farquharson 
LJ stressed that “public law remedies do not lie against 
domestic bodies, as they derive solely from the consent of 
the parties”.40
For JR to lie, according to Hoffman LJ, the power may 
be de facto or de jure, but it must be “governmental in 
nature”.41 As Sir Thomas Bingham MR stated:
the Jockey Club…has not been woven into any sys-
tem of governmental control of horseracing…This has 
the result that while the Jockey Club’s powers may be 
described as, in many ways, public they are in no sense 
governmental.42
A final thread of the CA’s reasoning was the rejection of the 
argument that “but for” Jockey Club’s existence, the gov-
ernment would be forced to intervene to regulate horserac-
ing and, as such, its powers could be considered “public”. 
Farquharson LJ straightforwardly dismissed the idea that 23 R v The International Stock Exchange of the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland, ex p Else (1982) Ltd [1993] QB 534.
24 Datafin, 835.
25 Ibid.
26 Elliott and Varuhas, (2017), p. 133.
27 Ibid.
28 R v East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p Walsh [1985] QB 152, 
164.
29 Aga Khan, 932.
30 Ibid. 931.
31 Elliott and Varuhas (2017), pp. 133–138.
32 R (McIntyre) v Gentoo [2010] EWHC 5 (Admin) [29].
33 Walsh. I.e. Where there is no public element.
34 [1983] WLR 1302.
35 [1991] COD 44.
36 [1993] 2 All E.R. 833.
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“any governmental body would assume control of racing”,43 
while Sir Thomas Bingham MR accepted that “the govern-
ment would probably be driven to create a public body to 
do so”44 but ultimately held that this did not alter the fact 
that its powers derived from contract and were thus not 
“governmental”.45
This approach has been definitive in English law and has 
been followed consistently,46 surviving its most recent chal-
lenge in R (Mullins) v Jockey Club (No. 1).47
3  The case for judicial review
Given the case law to date, SGBs are highly unlikely to 
be considered amenable to JR without a Supreme Court 
(“UKSC”) decision overruling Aga Khan.48 It is submitted 
that there is a strong case for such a decision and that the 
existing line of authority has been a “wrong turn”49 in Eng-
lish law. This Part will re-evaluate Aga Khan, criticising the 
court’s reasoning, drawing on support from analogous Eng-
lish case law and that of other jurisdictions. SGBs perform a 
public function now more than ever, and so, properly apply-
ing the test laid out in Part 2.1, should be amenable to JR.
It is important to establish at the outset that, though the 
argument herein will refer to SGBs in the abstract, each case 
would turn on its own facts and it is likely that some SGBs 
would be more readily susceptible to JR than others.50 How-
ever, given the fundamental similarities between the position 
and powers of SGBs, and the broad government interest in 
sport as a whole, it is legitimate to predicate the argument on 
the basis that they would generally be treated alike.
3.1  Re‑evaluating Aga Khan
The argument for overruling Aga Khan rests on two main 
propositions: that it places too much weight on the source of 
SGB power and fails to appreciate its public flavour—some-
thing which has become more pronounced in subsequent 
years. These central strands of argument shall be considered 
in turn, though it is impossible to separate them entirely.
3.1.1  The source of the power
Firstly, it is argued that Aga Khan focuses too much on the 
source of the powers of SGBs, as opposed to their func-
tion, which sits uncomfortably with the decision in Datafin 
and subsequent authorities.51 The court emphasised that 
JR was unavailable because the source of the power was 
a consensual, contractual relationship between the parties. 
However, this approach fails to recognise the true nature of 
the relationship between participants and SGBs, as well as 
the nature of SGB power.
The “contract” is fictional To describe the relationship 
between a participant and an SGB as purely contractual is 
artificial and unrealistic. SGB regulations bind participants 
regardless of any express contract and may even preclude 
individuals participating altogether.52 In Modahl v British 
Athletics Federation,53 the CA held that there are three ways 
in which a contractual link can be established between an 
SGB and an athlete: the “club basis” (a chain of mutually 
interdependent contracts starting with an employment con-
tract with a sports club in which the athlete agrees to be 
bound by the SGB regulations), the “participation basis” (a 
contract is implied by virtue of the athlete’s participation 
under the regulations) or the “submission basis” (a contract 
is implied by virtue of the athlete’s submission to the SGB’s 
regulatory procedures).54 Though there will be exceptions,55 
in the archetypal case, there is no express contract with the 
SGB. Indeed, in Modahl, Parker LJ dissented, considering 
there to be no real intention to create legal relations, nor any 
consideration to speak of.56
As Lord Denning MR observed in Enderby Town FC v 
Football Association,57 this “contract” is simply a “fiction 
created by the lawyers to give jurisdiction”.58 It is neces-
sary for the effective administration of sport,59 as there 
is no statutory scheme by which to otherwise enforce the 
rules. SGBs, as argued below, are de facto public bodies: it 
is simply an accident of history that they must rely on the 
contractual jurisdiction. Using a fiction created to increase 
oversight of SGBs to now deny such oversight via JR lacks 
52 Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633.
53 [2001] EWCA Civ 1447.
54 James (2017), pp. 31–32.
55 E.g. England rugby players will be contracted to the RFU when 
playing for the national team.
56 Modahl, [72–83].
57 [1971] Chap. 591.
58 Ibid. 606.
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common sense—the law should be “mature enough” to “do 
away with” such fictions.60
The lack of genuine consent There is also a lack of genu-
ine consent to SGBs’ jurisdiction, undermining further the 
argument against JR in Aga Khan. Each SGB has its own 
set of regulations61 which cover an incredibly broad array 
of issues including discipline, doping, intermediaries, cor-
ruption, betting, safety, safeguarding, player licensing, eli-
gibility, transfers, club ownership and finance, as well as 
the rules of the sport itself. They are even able to limit free-
dom of expression.62 As Lord Denning MR observed, such 
regulations are, in reality, a “legislative code”63 going far 
beyond a contractual regime. They regulate an entire sphere 
of conduct, both commercial and personal, and give SGBs 
the enormous power to impose sanctions which can range 
from 1-week suspensions, to lifetime bans64 as well as points 
deductions, fines, or even relegation.
Enormous power alone, though, is insufficient to under-
mine the purported contractual relationship. Freedom of 
contract is a fundamental feature of English contract law, 
and, as such, parties are free to agree to all these things. The 
key point, however, is that there is no “agreement” in the 
true sense of the word—these are rules which are imposed 
rather than consented to.
One might argue this is true of most contracts entered into 
in the modern day—for example, employment or consumer 
contracts. However, the enormous power of SGBs is doubly 
significant because they hold a monopoly. As such, partici-
pants are in an incredibly weak position and have no choice 
but to accept the regulations.65 This is ultimately “Hobson’s 
choice”—terms are imposed on a “take it or leave it” basis, 
and the latter is no option at all. By contrast, in the employ-
ment and consumer contexts, there will ordinarily be other 
job opportunities and other products to buy in the market.66 
In such monopolistic circumstances, “consensual submis-
sion” provides no basis on which to exclude JR,67 as there 
is no genuine consent.
This argument was rejected by Farquharson LJ in Aga 
Khan. He suggested that the “reality of the consent” was 
not undermined, as the imposition of rules was necessary 
for the administration of sport.68 The latter is certainly true, 
so it would be dangerous to suggest that there is insufficient 
consent for the “contract” to be binding, but it must nonethe-
less be recognised that the consent is artificial.69 The court 
here took an “unusually two-dimensional view”70 which is 
particularly unsatisfactory because “when genuine consent is 
absent, this is precisely when abuse of power is most likely, 
and judicial protection most needed”.71 The court should 
instead have focused on the unavoidability of submission to 
the decision-maker.72
Farquharson LJ’s view was echoed by the CA in Stret-
ford v Football Association,73 but the European Court of 
Human Rights recently took a different approach,74 holding 
that an arbitration clause enclosed in an SGB’s regulations 
had not been agreed in a “free and unambiguous manner”75 
and, thus, the athlete’s rights under Art.6(1) ECHR had not 
been validly waived. Though this was a human rights case, 
it nevertheless recognised that consent to SGB regulations 
is not real—a decision English courts will have to take into 
account.76
Should consent preclude judicial review? It is also arguable 
that the reasoning in Aga Khan is unsound because it could 
be applied to all forms of voluntary activity subject to a 
statutory licensing regime.77 It could be said that an appli-
cant to a statutory licensing authority “voluntarily” submits 
to its jurisdiction, as they could choose not to engage in 
the relevant activity. Of course, in such cases, “consensual 
submission” would not preclude JR. Nor should it for SGBs.
That said, Sir John Donaldson MR said in Datafin that 
“bodies whose sole source of power is a consensual submis-
sion to its jurisdiction” (emphasis added) will be excluded 
from the scope of JR.78 Consensual submission is not a statu-
tory licensing authority’s sole source of power. However, the 
same is arguably true of SGBs, as they wield de facto public 
power—power which is impliedly devolved, or perhaps even 
expressly derived, from government, as explained below.
Indeed, the source of the power cannot be fully separated 
from the nature of the power. The dicta in Datafin properly 
60 Nagle v Feilden, 646.
61 E.g. FA Handbook; RFU Regulations.
62 Boyes (2017).
63 Enderby Town, 606; Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union 
[1971] 2 QB 175, 190.
64 E.g. Former UK Athletics coach George Skafidas was given a life-
time ban from all sport in 2016.
65 Beloff and Kerr (1996).
66 In any event, these areas are also regulated heavily by statute.
67 Pannick (1992), 2–5.
68 Aga Khan, 930.
69 Beloff (2006), 2; Pannick (1997), 152.
70 Elliott and Varuhas (2017), p. 139.
71 Ibid.
72 Elliott (2012), 101.
73 [2007] EWCA Civ 238.
74 Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland App nos. 40575/10 and 
67474/10 (ECHR, 2 October 2018).
75 Ibid. [114].
76 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45.
77 Beloff et al. (2012), pp. 263–264.
78 Datafin, 838.
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suggest that where a body is exercising a public function, 
there will not be a purely contractual relationship—the very 
publicness of the power means that public law is applicable, 
regardless of any contract.79
Given the fictional nature of the “contract” and the arti-
ficiality of the consent to SGBs’ jurisdiction, placing such 
weight on the source of the power as the court did in Aga 
Khan is inappropriate80—particularly when the modern test 
for amenability requires a more functional approach, and 
the existence of a contract has been held not to be fatal to 
JR claims in subsequent decisions.81 SGBs’ power may for-
mally be predicated on contract, but the reality is that they 
are performing a public function.
3.1.2  Satisfying the public function test
Having established that there should be no contractual and/
or consensual bar to an application for JR against an SGB, 
it can now be argued that SGBs should be amenable to JR 
because they satisfy the public function test set out in Part 
2.1. Though there has always been a strong case for SGBs 
satisfying this test,82 it has now become irrefutable owing to 
the change in government policy, which allows the missing 
“governmental” element to be found.
The enormous public interest in sport gives it great 
potential as a government policy tool to achieve social and 
political objectives, and it is undoubtedly used to promote 
national standing.83 Indeed, throughout modern history, 
sport has been used as a bargaining tool in international 
relations.84 This immediately suggests a public element, but 
more specific arguments can be made. These arguments are 
ones which have often been put forward, but it is submitted 
that the wider context has changed such that they can now 
be made more forcefully.
The “But For” argument Firstly, it is submitted that, but for 
the work of SGBs, the government—owing to its direct 
interest in sport and its governance—would itself be driven 
to regulate sport, demonstrating that SGBs are, in reality, 
carrying out a public function. This is a test frequently used 
to determine amenability85 but was answered in the negative 
in Aga Khan,86 endorsing the view of Rose J in R v FA, ex p 
Football League:
I find no sign of underpinning directly or indirectly by 
any organ or agency of the State or any potential gov-
ernment interest…nor is there any evidence to suggest 
that if the FA did not exist the State would intervene to 
create a public body to perform its functions.87
With respect, it is suggested that such views are out of date 
and merit reconsideration. The government today has a clear, 
direct interest in sport,88 and there is plenty to suggest that, 
in the absence of SGBs, they would intervene.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Excheq-
uer funding of sport reached unprecedented levels89 and, 
in 2002, sport was properly recognised in government, as a 
key policy objective of the Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport (“DCMS”).90 The DCMS is now primarily 
responsible for administering public sports policy, albeit at 
arm’s length via several non-departmental public bodies91 
(“NDPBs”), including Sport England and UK Sport. The 
traditional view that “‘the government does not and should 
not run sport’ no longer reflects the complexities of modern 
sports policy”,92 nor the reality of its implementation in the 
UK.
The 2015 DCMS “Sporting Future” policy paper gave 
some telling indications of the government’s direct inter-
est in sport, setting out the government’s strategy of “har-
nessing the power of sport for the good of our whole soci-
ety”,93 emphasising sport’s personal, economic and social 
impact. Sport’s role in the pursuit of public health goals is 
significant,94 and SGBs are often key to implementing such 
policy.95
In addition, as the 2015 paper announced, government 
agencies Sport England and UK Sport have developed a new 
Code for Sports Governance setting out the levels of “trans-
parency, accountability and financial integrity” required of 
SGBs seeking public funding.96
79 Elliott and Varuhas (2017), p. 140.
80 Elliott (2012).
81 Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 1 WLR 
1988; R (McIntyre) v Gentoo (n 32).
82 Beloff and Kerr (1996); Beloff et al. (2012), p. 268.
83 Boyes (2017), 364.
84 E.g. Sporting boycotts of apartheid South Africa, Cold War Olym-
pic boycotts.
85 Pannick (1992), 5.
86 Supra, note 43; criticised by Beloff and Kerr (1996).
87 [1993] 2 All E.R. 833.
88 Gardiner et al. (2012), pp. 89–90.
89 Lewis and Taylor (2014), p. 10.
90 Ibid. p. 22.
91 Ibid. pp. 23–24.
92 Ibid. p. 10.
93 Supra, note 2, Chap. 3.
94 Boyes (2017), 363–364.
95 Supra, note 2, Chap. 1.
96 ‘A Code for Sports Governance’ (uk sport) <http://www.ukspo 
rt.gov.uk/resou rces/gover nance -code> Accessed 14 March 2019.
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Furthermore, the DCMS Committee (“DCMSC”)97 has 
conducted detailed enquiries into matters of concern within 
sport, including homophobia,98 women and sport,99 match-
fixing in tennis100 and, currently, sports governance more 
broadly.101 The DCMSC’s very existence demonstrates a 
government interest in sport, but the nature of its enquiries 
reveals a particular desire to ensure accountability. This is 
perhaps best exemplified by its 2018 “combatting doping in 
sport” report which followed an intrusive and very public 
enquiry, centred around British Cycling.102
Indeed, the government is particularly concerned with 
anti-doping. In 2003, the UK government signed the Copen-
hagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport, in which they 
agreed to formally recognise and implement the World Anti-
Doping Code (“WADC”) and, in 2006, ratified the Inter-
national Convention against Doping in Sport. Moreover, 
the government showed its dedication to the anti-doping 
movement by creating the UK Anti-Doping agency in 2009, 
another NDPB. It is responsible for the sample collection, 
testing and whereabouts programmes of the majority of UK 
athletes. By funding an anti-doping programme and by sign-
ing up to internationally agreed anti-doping objectives, the 
government seeks to promote fair and clean sport, further 
highlighting its direct interest.
A further example of government expansion into sport 
has been in the field of anti-corruption. The Gambling 
Commission—another NDPB—created the Sports Betting 
Intelligence Unit (“SBIU”) in 2005 to monitor gambling and 
uphold integrity in sport, while s.42 of the Gambling Act 
2005 was introduced by the government specifically to target 
match-fixing.103 Section 42 makes it a criminal offence to 
“cheat at gambling”,104 which includes interference with a 
sporting event to which the gambling relates.105
More recently, in 2014, the government published the UK 
Anti-Corruption Plan, which set out a cross-governmental 
approach to tackle corruption, including specific measures 
addressing corruption in sport. Principal among these was 
the Sport and Sports Betting Integrity Action Plan, launched 
by the Gambling Commission in 2015, which delineates the 
responsibilities of, inter alia, SGBs and government in com-
batting corruption. Such an initiative is yet another example 
of how the government’s interest and involvement in sport 
has grown since the early 1990s.
There is thus a strong argument that “but for” SGBs, the 
government would be driven to regulate sport itself, such 
is its interest in the sector. SGBs are therefore exercising a 
public function.
The “Interwoven” argument Moreover, as required by the 
courts in Datafin and Aga Khan, SGBs are “woven into the 
fabric of public regulation”.106
For example, the role of administering anti-doping rules 
is not exclusive to UKAD. All SGBs adopt the WADC into 
their own regulations and assume responsibility, along with 
UKAD, for its implementation. Indeed, it is often the SGBs 
themselves that act as prosecutor in doping cases and who 
are responsible for enforcing bans imposed by the National 
Anti-Doping Panel.
Much the same point can be made with regard to anti-cor-
ruption. Working closely alongside the police and the SBIU, 
SGBs have taken a proactive role in the fight against corrup-
tion.107 All major SGBs have extensive anti-corruption regu-
lations108 aimed at deterring and punishing conduct which is 
corrupt, or potentially so, through sporting sanctions. While 
not all conduct punished by SGBs is also criminal, the most 
serious cases will be and, by implementing such comprehen-
sive regulations, SGBs play an important role in preventing 
criminal behaviour.
However, SGBs’ jurisdiction does not cover those who 
may be involved from outside of sport in corruption and, 
thus, an effective approach to tackling the problem requires 
cooperation with, inter alia, law enforcement agencies and 
government.109 As aforementioned, this joined-up approach 
is explicitly recognised in the Sport and Sports Betting Integ-
rity Action Plan, which imposes certain requirements on 
each of the key stakeholders, including the Gambling Com-
mission—a government agency. In this context, too, SGBs 
are therefore woven into the fabric of public regulation.
Moreover, the SGBs of sports such as rugby, football, 
boxing and other contact sports have exclusive jurisdiction 
over an area which would ordinarily be governed by the 
criminal law. Following R v Barnes,110 violent conduct in 
103 Ibid. p. 143.
104 S.42(1) Gambling Act 2005.
105 S.42(3) Gambling Act 2005.
106 Aga Khan, 923.
107 Ibid. p. 145.
108 E.g. RFU Regulation 17; FA Betting Rules 2019–2020.
109 Thompson (2016).
110 [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
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parli ament .uk/busin ess/commi ttees /commi ttees -a-z/commo ns-selec t/
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ry/. Accessed 14 March 2019.
101 DCMSC, ‘Sport governance inquiry’ (Parliament) https ://www.
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the sporting arena is exempted from criminal sanction, as 
long as it remains within reasonable bounds of the rules. 
As such, these SGBs fulfil the function of policing those 
bounds by ensuring that violent conduct in breach of the 
rules is sanctioned appropriately. In other words, a jurisdic-
tion is carved out of the criminal law for certain SGBs. This 
specific function has strong public flavour in itself, given the 
otherwise public nature of the sanctions the conduct would 
attract, and it is also an example of how SGBs are woven 
into public regulation.
Indeed, this is highlighted explicitly in the memorandum 
of understanding between the FA, FAW, the Crown Pros-
ecution Service and the Association of Chief Police Offic-
ers.111 It recognises that there are often situations in which 
football’s SGBs will have concurrent jurisdiction with law 
enforcement agencies and sets out the terms of their coop-
eration in relation to both investigating and sanctioning.
A further example is the statutory regulation of foot-
ball hooliganism, which was the culmination of prolonged 
efforts by the government, in combination with the police 
and football’s SGBs, to gain control of the issue.112 For the 
offences under the Football (Offences) Act 1991 to be made 
out, or for a Football Banning Order to be imposed under 
the Football Spectators Act 1989, the match with which 
the relevant conduct is connected must be a “designated” 
football match—ultimately, a game under the authority of 
the SGBs.113 In this regard, football’s SGBs are inextricably 
integrated into governmental regulation.
Of course, these latter examples are confined to certain 
sports and as such can only advance the argument insofar as 
those specific SGBs are concerned. However, there is strong 
evidence of a more general integration of SGBs into the 
public sphere and, in any event, as noted above,114 it may 
be that certain SGBs are more susceptible to JR than others.
Implied devolution of power One might nonetheless argue 
that the government has still abstained from directly inter-
vening in day-to-day sports regulation; it is left to private 
bodies and as such falls properly within the private sector. 
Indeed, in 2018, the government rejected a petition to cre-
ate an independent regulator for English football, on the 
basis that the existing authorities do a satisfactory job, 
negating any need or desire to create a government body.115 
Government:
believes sports are best governed by modern, transpar-
ent, accountable and representative governing bodies, 
able to act decisively in the long-term interest of each 
sport and its participants116
However, this reflects an implied devolution of governmen-
tal power. By actively choosing not to legislate in this field, 
owing to its satisfaction with the work of the FA, the govern-
ment is impliedly granting the SGB power to continue regu-
lating football, in the same way that Lloyd LJ considered the 
panel in Datafin to be operating.117 The same can be said of 
many SGBs, though there isn’t such explicit evidence. The 
government has a strong interest in sport’s regulation, but, 
due to their expertise and natural independence, it considers 
existing SGBs better-placed to perform that function and 
thus, far from abstaining, gives them implied authority to 
continue doing so. That sport is administered by private bod-
ies is simply an accident of history.118
In any event, SGBs’ receipt of public funding, via Sport 
England and UK Sport, suggests that their power may be 
somewhat derived from government expressly.
Public interest Finally, the “massive public interest in 
sport”119 plays a role in creating public flavour. The fact that 
sport can affect people’s lives in so many ways, as fans, par-
ticipants and aspiring participants, means that the public at 
large has an interest in its good governance. Though “public 
interest” has been considered distinct from “public law”,120 
it is suggested that the two can be linked. Public interest 
affects government decision-making and ultimately drives 
public policy. As such, an area of significant public interest 
is almost inevitably an area of government interest, such that 
its regulation will have public flavour. Sport is one such area.
Moreover, all SGBs act, or at least purport to act, in the 
public interest.121 They commonly cite as their object the 
promotion and growth of the sport throughout their terri-
tory.122 This may include commercialisation, but the primary 
objective remains the development of the sport itself, which 
111 ‘Protocol on the appropriate handling of incidents falling under 
both criminal and football regulatory jurisdiction’ (The FA, 23 
December 2013) <http://www.thefa .com/-/media /files /pdf/the-
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is in the public interest. SGBs thus perform a function which 
is “other-regarding”123—something typical of government—
which might further suggest that a public function is being 
exercised.124
There are thus multiple ways to demonstrate that SGBs 
wield de facto public power. Undeniably, as the sports indus-
try has grown exponentially over the past two decades, so 
has the government’s interest in it. In Aga Khan, Hoffman LJ 
considered that the English legislator’s attitude to racing was 
“akin to its attitude to religion…something to be encouraged 
but not the business of government”.125 This statement can 
no longer hold true. Aga Khan merits reconsideration: SGBs 
are performing a public function.
3.1.3  Supporting case law
The argument premised herein is not altogether unsupported 
by English case law. Indeed, in Aga Khan itself, Farquharson 
LJ refused to “discount the possibility that in some special 
circumstances the remedy might lie”,126 while Lord Woolf 
MR similarly left the possibility open in Wilander v Tobin 
(No. 2).127 It is suggested that the new-found governmental 
element provides such special circumstances.
In R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses,128 Brown 
J held that he would have allowed JR of the Jockey Club 
but for the fact that he was bound by the decision in Law. 
He considered the function of regulating a sport “strikingly 
akin to the exercise of a statutory licensing power” and, as 
such, had “no difficulty in regarding it as one of a public 
law body”.129 The court in R v Disciplinary Committee of 
the Jockey Club, ex p Massingberg-Mundy130 considered 
itself similarly bound, but otherwise would have allowed JR. 
More recently, in Jockey Club v Buffham, Gray J described 
the Jockey Club as a “public authority in every sense”.131 
The Jockey Club—no longer the regulator of horseracing in 
Britain—was no different in its role and powers than other 
SGBs.
Support can also be derived from the “borderline cases”, 
particularly those in which “self-regulatory bodies” have 
been held amenable to JR. For example, the Advertising 
Standards Authority (“ASA”)132 and the former Press Com-
plaints Commission133 have been considered to be subject 
to JR, as has the Code of Practice Committee of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (“CPC”).134 All are/were private, 
self-regulatory organisations without any statutory basis but 
which regulate(d) important parts of public life and were 
woven into the fabric of public regulation.
Indeed, in R v Advertising Standards Authority Ltd, ex p 
Insurance Service plc,135 Glidewell LJ, in holding that the 
ASA was subject to JR, said:
The Authority has no powers granted to it by statute or 
at common law, nor does it have any contractual rela-
tionship with the advertisers whom it controls. Nev-
ertheless it is clearly exercising a public law function 
which, if the Authority did not exist, would no doubt 
be exercised by the Director General of Fair Trading.
For the reasons outlined in Part 3.1, it is argued that SGBs 
are analogous.
In Professional Counselling Aids,136 Popplewell J reluc-
tantly found the CPC amenable to JR, emphasising that 
Datafin had “enlarge[d] enormously”137 the scope of JR and 
placing reliance on the decision in Insurance Service. The 
latter was endorsed specifically in Aga Khan.138
Likewise, the Bar Council was held reviewable in R 
v General Council of the Bar, ex p Percival139, a body 
“empowered by its rules to prosecute [complaints] before 
the disciplinary tribunal as an adjudicating body exercis-
ing powers delegated by the judges”.140 The Council has 
an important role in regulating the Bar—a field in which 
the government certainly has an interest, given the way bar-
risters affect the determination of individuals’ fundamental 
rights. But for the Bar Council it seems incredibly likely that 
a statutory authority—like the Solicitors Regulatory Author-
ity—would be created. SGBs perform a similar role, regu-
lating an area of government interest and quasi-judicially 
determining fundamental rights.
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Furthermore, parallels can be drawn between the posi-
tion of SGBs and the limited company subjected to JR in 
Beer. In the same way that Hampshire Farmers Markets Ltd. 
regulated access to a market in which there was significant 
public interest, so too do SGBs. Indeed, the market to which 
SGBs regulate access is an awful lot larger, as it operates at 
national level.
More recently, the Independent Press Standards Organisa-
tion (“IPSO”), which is one of several independent regula-
tors of the UK press, was subjected to JR.141 Though the 
court did not formally decide the jurisdictional point, Warby 
J allowed JR to proceed in spite of the fact that IPSO has not 
been recognised by the statutory Press Recognition Panel 
and his own recognition that “the argument against IPSO 
decisions being amenable to [JR] is stronger than it was in 
the case of the Jockey Club”.142 Though it operates in the 
public interest, IPSO does not operate a monopoly and the 
court doubted that government would step in if it did not 
exist, as the Leveson Report did not recommend state regula-
tion of the press.143 This might be seen as a further enlarge-
ment of the scope of JR which, in fact, goes beyond SGBs.
Therefore, allowing JR of SGBs would not be at odds with 
existing case law and would, in fact, make it more coher-
ent—that they are not considered amenable is anomalous.
3.1.4  The comparative argument
It is also relevant that other jurisdictions have recognised 
the public function of SGBs. In French law, sports discipli-
nary sanctions are classed as administrative acts which can 
therefore only be reviewed by the administrative courts,144 
while in Spain the public nature of sport is recognised in 
constitutional law145 and there is a specific administrative 
court dedicated to resolving sports regulatory disputes.146
Turning to other common law jurisdictions, the High 
Court of Australia allowed JR of an SGB in Forbes v NSW 
Trotting Club,147 where the function of controlling the 
sport—“a public activity”—was considered significant. 
The same position has been reached in New Zealand,148 
Canada,149 South Africa150 and, albeit to a limited extent,151 
the USA.152 The English position thus appears to be an 
anomaly, “unjustifiably lagging behind its Commonwealth 
counterparts”.153
The argument here runs deeper than simply saying “they 
do it, so we should do it”. The crucial point is that these 
jurisdictions have recognised the public flavour of SGBs: 
they have recognised why SGBs properly fit into the public 
sphere. SGBs have much the same role and powers world 
over, so it appears incongruous that English law is asking 
the same question and getting a different answer. This is 
particularly significant as regards the other common law 
jurisdictions, as the principles at play are broadly the same. 
That England is the odd one out is telling.
Most concerning perhaps is that JR of SGBs has long 
been available in Scotland.154 Of course, Scots law does not 
distinguish between public and private law in the same way 
as English law, which may account for the different result, 
but it nonetheless sits uncomfortably given the geographi-
cal proximity of the jurisdictions. Indeed, in some sport-
ing contexts, athletes from the two jurisdictions compete 
together, under a single SGB.155 It was held in Lennox v 
British Show Jumping Association156 that such bodies 
would be reviewable in Scotland. This results in “forum 
shopping”,157 whereby a party will simply seek to claim in 
the most favourable jurisdiction. Such inconsistencies are 
unsatisfactory and, for example, could lead to the situation 
whereby athletes of the same nationality, in the same sport, 
might have differing legal remedies available to them simply 
because of the team/SGB of which they are a member.
The fact that so many other jurisdictions have recognised 
the public flavour of SGBs certainly makes Aga Khan appear 
anomalous. However, Hoffman LJ was not drawn by com-
parative arguments:
different countries draw the line between public and 
private regulation in different places. The fact that cer-
tain functions of the Jockey Club could be exercised 
by a statutory body and that they are so exercised in 
some other countries does not make them governmen-
tal functions in England.158
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While it is certainly true that different jurisdictions approach 
the public/private divide differently, comparative analysis in 
this field has particular value. The sports industry is truly 
international: athletes from England and Wales regularly 
compete against athletes from other jurisdictions and the 
fact that foreign athletes can access JR might give them 
an advantage—as explained in Part 4—which adds to the 
case for JR. It is surely desirable to enhance consistency 
in international sports law generally, especially when there 
are good, principled reasons for doing so. To do so is in the 
interests of both the administrators and participants of sport 
globally.
The court’s approach in Aga Khan is out of date, and it is 
time to follow our Commonwealth counterparts.
3.1.5  To what extent?
Having argued that SGBs should be amenable to JR, it is 
important to consider to what extent they would be so. For 
an application for JR to succeed, not only must the body 
be susceptible to JR, but so must the specific decision in 
question.159 A public body in the modern day exercises 
many functions, some of which will not be “public”—such 
as entering employment contracts—and these will not be 
judicially reviewable.160
SGBs similarly perform a multitude of functions. Many 
operate their national team and, as such, undertake an array 
of commercial tasks such as negotiating sponsorship and 
paying players. Such purely commercial functions would be 
outside the scope of JR. It is only the regulatory function of 
SGBs which should be reviewable—only in this regard can 
their function be described as “public”.
4  Private law remedies
The final issue which must be considered is the availability 
of private law remedies. In Aga Khan, Hoffman LJ stated 
that the existence of “entirely adequate” remedies in private 
law meant that no injustice would be caused by the denial of 
a public law remedy.161 This appears to allow the argument 
that private law remedies in the sporting context are, in fact, 
inadequate and, as such, JR should be allowed. However, he 
also stated that JR should not be used “to patch up” remedies 
available against bodies which would otherwise not be ame-
nable to JR.162 Indeed, this seems to be the approach adopted 
consistently by English courts.163 As Lord Oliver explained 
in Leech v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison,164 alterna-
tive remedies are relevant to the court’s decision to permit 
JR, but not to the prior question of amenability.165
Therefore, the inadequacy of private law remedies can-
not by itself make the case for amenability, but is relevant 
to the broader question of whether SGBs should be subject 
to JR. As such, this Part will highlight the limitations of the 
private law causes of action used to challenge SGBs, both 
substantive and procedural, and will argue that they should 
not preclude a claim for JR. This will demonstrate that the 
debate in Part 3 is not purely academic166: there are practical 
reasons why an aggrieved sports participant would want to 
pursue JR as opposed to a private law cause of action.
On this view, sporting claimants have rights in both pub-
lic and private law. This might be thought odd in the light 
of the procedural exclusivity rule,167 but, though a claim 
cannot be brought in public and private law simultaneously, 
the harshness of this rule has been mitigated168 such that a 
claim is unlikely to be struck out simply for using the “less 
appropriate” procedure.169 Indeed, in Clark v University of 
Lincolnshire and Humberside,170 Sedley LJ considered that, 
though JR could have been sought, a claim in private law 
was just as appropriate as there was simply “a contractual 
relationship which happens to possess a public law dimen-
sion”.171 The same can be said of the participant–SGB rela-
tionship. It is argued that rights against SGBs may arise in 
public and private law172 and, as such, that litigants should 
be able to mount their claim depending on which jurisdic-
tion would provide the better remedy in the circumstances. 
Indeed, this is the approach taken in New Zealand.173
4.1  Private law causes of action
Claims for breach of contract, restraint of trade and in the so-
called private law “supervisory jurisdiction” have proved to 
be the primary mechanisms for challenging SGBs in English 
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law and, as such, will be considered here. However, chal-
lenges could also be mounted to varying degrees in the con-
tractual “public policy” jurisdiction,174 competition law175 
and EU law—though the latter would also be possible in JR.
4.1.1  Breach of contract
As explained above, SGB regulations are readily interpreted 
as contracts.176 Though this is somewhat artificial, it is a 
fiction the law has adopted consistently, out of necessity. 
Without an express or implied contract between the SGB 
and the participants, SGBs would have no legal basis for the 
exercise of its powers177—participants could simply choose 
not to accept SGB regulatory decisions, and sport would 
descend into chaos. As merely de facto public bodies, SGBs 
must rely on private law.
As such, courts can perform a degree of review via claims 
for breach of contract. Some SGBs today explicitly prescribe 
the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in 
their regulations.178 Thus, a decision might be challenged 
as a breach of an express contractual term. A court could 
then make a declaration as to the validity of the decision 
and remedy any ill-effects by awarding an injunction and/
or damages.179
Equally, the courts have shown themselves willing to 
imply the principles of natural justice into SGB regula-
tions.180 Indeed, “public law principles” were implied into 
contracts at the highest level in Braganza v BP Shipping,181 
to conduct a review “almost indistinguishable from the gen-
eral approach to review of public powers”.182 This mirrors 
the view of Lord Woolf MR in Modahl v British Athletics 
Federation (No. 1)183 that there is:
no reason why there should be any difference as to 
what constitutes unfairness or why the standard of fair-
ness required by an implied term should differ from 
that required of the same tribunal under public law184
It can thus be said with confidence that the substance of 
the obligations owed by SGBs as a matter of private law is 
broadly the same as those they would owe if their decisions 
were amenable to JR.185
However, this may undermine one of the principal argu-
ments in favour of precluding JR: that it would illegitimately 
cut across the intentions of the parties to the contract.186 
After all, if contract law itself recognises that party auton-
omy is limited by principles equivalent to those of JR, how 
can the argument against the applicability of these principles 
in JR be maintained? One might argue that the court in Bra-
ganza was merely giving effect to the presumed intentions of 
the parties, but the reality is that the court went much further 
than that.187 These standards will invariably be applied “in 
the absence of very clear language”188 to the contrary. In 
private law terms, it appears that these are terms implied 
“in law” into certain types of contract, rather than “in fact”. 
Therefore, the argument in support of Aga Khan becomes 
difficult to sustain.
It is also a limit of the implied terms approach that 
parties could exclude their application through express 
terms.189 One might argue that the same “exclusion” could 
be achieved in JR via an ouster clause. However, given the 
restrictive interpretative approach taken by the courts to such 
clauses,190 it is suggested that an effective exclusion of the 
courts’ jurisdiction would be less likely in public law.191
Of course, an action for breach of contract will only be 
available where a contract exists. Though the courts have 
been willing to imply contracts readily in the sports con-
text,192 participants without a contract, such as those pre-
vented from entering the sport in the first place, will have no 
remedy here. This action will also be of limited use to par-
ticipants looking to challenge regulations themselves: only 
new regulations which the SGB makes ultra vires could be 
challenged. When an action for breach of contract is unavail-
able, JR would provide a remedy.
4.1.2  Restraint of trade
An associated mechanism for challenging SGBs is the doc-
trine of restraint of trade. According to the leading case, 
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Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co,193 
a contractual term which places a restraint on the exercise of 
an individual’s trade will be void unless it can be justified as 
reasonable by reference to the interests of the parties and the 
interests of the public.194 It has evolved as a public policy 
tool to protect individual autonomy and has been extended 
to non-contractual cases.195 It can be used to challenge not 
only SGB decisions,196 but also regulations themselves.197 
Though it does not give rise to an action for damages, courts 
can make declarations as to validity198 and may be able to 
award an injunction.199
However, the doctrine is not without its limitations. 
Firstly, it is not always clear where the burden of proof lies in 
sports cases, nor how the standard of reasonableness should 
be formulated.200 In Stevenage Borough FC v The Football 
League,201 Carnwath J suggested that the burden was on the 
individual seeking to challenge the provision, adopting a 
reasonableness standard influenced by JR,202 but in Newport 
AFC v Football Association of Wales203 the court treated the 
issue using orthodox contractual principles, with the onus on 
the SGB to justify the rule. There is still no “universal and 
immutable standard of review”.204 Such uncertainty makes 
the doctrine unappealing.
Its greatest limitation, though, is that it is confined to 
cases concerning “trade”.205 In Ray v PGA Ltd.,206 the court 
held that the doctrine did not apply because the claimant’s 
contract was a “training” contract, not a “trading” con-
tract.207 More famously, British sprinter Dwain Chambers 
was refused an interim injunction to enable him to compete 
at the 2008 Olympics, in part, because the Olympic Games 
is an amateur event.208 The court held that, even if it could 
be argued that his Olympic participation could give rise to 
an “indirect financial benefit”, Chambers’ “prospects of suc-
cess” at the Olympics were “at best, speculative”, such that 
it would be difficult to argue that there was any restraint of 
trade.209 As Mackay J put it, “his prospects of arguing…that 
this is a right to work case are not good”.210
This was built on the decision of Gasser v Stinson,211 
where it was held that the restraint of trade doctrine could 
not apply where an athlete was merely deprived of a “chance 
of building up a reputation and to later exploit it for com-
mercial gain” but that it would apply where an athlete was 
prevented from participating in a competition from which 
they otherwise would have been able to make a financial 
gain as a “direct consequence”. Therefore, amateur athletes, 
or athletes competing at such a level that they are unable 
to be sure of obtaining any direct financial gain from their 
participation, may be left without a remedy under restraint of 
trade. In such circumstances, JR could provide a meaningful 
alternative.
4.1.3  The supervisory jurisdiction
Given the possible vacuum in the law where those affected 
by SGB regulations are not in a contractual relationship with 
the SGB,212 English private law appears to have developed 
a residual “supervisory jurisdiction”. In Bradley v Jockey 
Club,213 affirmed on appeal,214 it was held that, even in the 
absence of a contractual relationship, an SGB decision “is 
subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court in accord-
ance with the principles stated in Nagle v Feilden”.215
In Nagle, Lord Denning MR stated that courts may have 
a jurisdiction to see that exercise of “predominant power 
over…a trade or profession…is not abused”216 as a matter 
of public policy. Indeed, in Bradley, Richards J noted that 
this area has assumed “even greater importance” given the 
attitude of the courts towards the JR of SGBs.217 He stated:
given the difficulties that sometimes arise in draw-
ing the precise boundary between the two, I would 
consider it surprising and unsatisfactory if a private 
law claim in relation to the decision of a domestic 
193 [1894] AC 535.
194 Beloff et al. (2012), p. 73.
195 Pharmaceutical Society v Dickson [1970] AC 403.
196 Lewis and Taylor (2014), p. 922.
197 E.g. Eastham v Newcastle United FC [1964] Ch 413.
198 Lewis and Taylor (2014), p. 92.
199 Newport AFC v Football Association of Wales [1995] 2 All ER 
87.
200 Beloff et al. (2012), p. 74.
201 (1996) 9 Admin LR 109.
202 [2006] ISLR, SLR 128 [60].
203 (1995) unreported, 12 April.
204 Beloff et al. (2012), p. 72.
205 E.g. Ray v Professional Golfers Association (1997) unreported, 
15 April.
206 Ibid.
207 Beloff et al. (2012), p. 74.
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body required the court to adopt a materially different 
approach from a judicial review claim218
As such, under this supervisory jurisdiction, the court may 
review both procedural and substantive fairness and make 
a declaration as to the “lawfulness of the decision taken”219 
regardless of the existence of a contract.
Nonetheless, the scope and basis of this jurisdiction 
were not entirely clear following Bradley, with particular 
uncertainty over whether it was limited to cases concern-
ing the claimant’s right to work. However, in Mullins v 
McFarlane and The Jockey Club,220 it was held that there 
was “no jurisdictional…boundary to the power of the Court 
to grant declaratory relief in this context”221—it was not 
so restricted. It thus appears incredibly broad, and it may 
be that the matter need only be of “importance”.222 It was 
exercised in both Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Author-
ity223 and McKeown v British Horseracing Authority,224 but 
remains a relatively unexplored area, raising a plethora of 
questions.
Primarily, its basis remains uncertain. Bradley placed 
great reliance on Nagle, which itself was a “restraint of 
trade” case,225 but the jurisdiction has been construed far 
more broadly. Bradley may have elided restraint of trade 
with the court’s general jurisdiction to grant a declaration 
(now under CPR 40.20),226 a point of confusion evident 
throughout the case law. In McInnes v Onslow-Fane227 “pub-
lic law principles” were seemingly applied under the court’s 
general jurisdiction, but the court drew heavily on Nagle and 
restraint of trade.228 Likewise, JR principles were injected 
into restraint of trade in Nagle and Stevenage Borough FC. 
It may be that in Nagle and Onslow-Fane, the courts were 
seeking a basis for the grounds of review necessary to do 
justice and so resorted to the doctrine of restraint of trade, 
as opposed to relying specifically on the court’s general 
jurisdiction.229 Indeed, Hoffman LJ thought there was “an 
improvisatory air”230 about the solution in Nagle.
The result is that there is a significant lack of clarity over 
the true basis of the jurisdiction expounded in Bradley and 
Mullins. This is unsatisfactory and may be practically sig-
nificant in determining whether amateurs can claim, whether 
regulations as well as decisions can be challenged, and 
where the burden of proof lies. Indeed, in Bradley, Richards 
J deliberately left the question of the burden open.231 Yet, as 
he noted, such difficulties would evaporate if JR applied.232 
At the time of Nagle and Onslow-Fane, the scope of JR was 
more limited than it is now—had the functional approach to 
amenability existed, it would surely have provided the more 
natural solution.233
Moreover, if it is based on restraint of trade, a broad juris-
diction as suggested in Mullins would seem to extend a field 
of public policy; something which, on orthodox private law 
principles, is controversial234—particularly without proper 
consideration of the reasons for doing so. Recognising that 
SGBs are exercising a de facto public function would give a 
principled justification for review.
There are thus many question marks hanging over the 
supervisory jurisdiction. There is a confused body of law 
which has the effect of providing JR “by the back door”; an 
intellectually unsatisfactory approach and one likely to cause 
difficulties in practice. Accepting JR of SGBs, it is submit-
ted, would be preferable.
4.1.4  Substantive assessment
Each of the private law causes of action discussed has its 
merits, but also limitations. Particular uncertainty lies over 
restraint of trade and the supervisory jurisdiction, largely 
owing to attempts to infuse the private law with public law 
principles. Allowing JR of SGBs would obviate the need 
to perform contortions in private law: it has a body of rules 
which could readily be applied to SGBs in a transparent and 
principled way, with no need for adjustment, regardless of 
the applicant’s status (professional or contractual), and by 
judges skilled in their application.235
Furthermore, mounting a challenge to the regulations 
themselves would be more straightforward in JR. Indeed, in 
Aga Khan, Farquharson LJ suggested that:
If for example the JC failed to fulfil its obligations 
under the charter by making discriminatory rules, it 
218 Ibid. [37].
219 Ibid.
220 [2006] EWHC 986 (QB).
221 Ibid. [39].
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may be that those affected would have a remedy in 
public law236
In JR, SGB regulations could be substantively challenged 
on the well-recognised grounds of fundamental rights,237 
Wednesbury reasonableness238 or proportionality,239 though 
discrimination claims could today be brought under Part 7 of 
the Equality Act 2010. Successful challenges to SGB regu-
lations have been scarce in the contractual and supervisory 
jurisdictions,240 while restraint of trade is limited. JR would 
provide a reliable means of challenge, including for amateur 
athletes.
The remedial differences are also salient. In contract, the 
available remedies are comprehensive: damages, injunctions 
or a declaration. In the supervisory jurisdiction, however, 
applicants can only obtain a declaration. Though a declara-
tion can be a “highly effective weapon”,241 its effect may 
be limited in a non-contractual context. One cannot be in 
contempt of court for ignoring a declaration242 and, if there 
is no contract, there remains no basis upon which to claim an 
injunction. It is therefore unclear just how effective a remedy 
this would be, albeit that there would be public pressure on 
SGBs to comply.
By contrast, in JR, declarations and injunctions,243 as 
well as mandatory, prohibiting and quashing orders,244 are 
available. The latter would be particularly powerful in undo-
ing the effects of sanctions, though would largely have the 
same effect in practice as an injunction. Remedies in JR 
are certainly more powerful than those under the supervi-
sory jurisdiction, though both are discretionary, while the 
principal difference with the contractual jurisdiction is com-
pensation—in JR, damages are rarely available.245 However, 
they are not usually the most important remedy for sport-
ing claimants246 and, in any event, if cases must be brought 
within the short time limit of JR and are disposed of quickly, 
the potential for significant losses to accrue is less likely.
4.2  Procedural matters
The JR procedure is often conceived as providing protection 
to defendant public bodies, which are politically accountable 
and whose effectiveness would be hindered by the threat 
of ordinary litigation.247 Oliver has argued that there is no 
reason why SGBs should benefit from such protection248 but, 
given the softening of the procedural exclusivity rule, this 
protective function has diminished in importance for de facto 
SGBs, as appropriate claims outside of the JR time limit may 
nonetheless be brought in private law.
It must also be recognised that JR procedure may bring 
advantages for claimants, especially in the sporting context. 
Three procedural points of difference add force to the argu-
ment that private law remedies are not necessarily adequate, 
and JR more suitable.
4.2.1  Hearing procedure
Firstly, the JR hearing procedure is far better suited to sports 
disputes than that of private law, as recognised by Carnwath 
J in Stevenage Borough FC:
in spite of the efforts of the parties, and the economy of 
presentation, the writ procedure, with pleadings, dis-
covery and oral evidence, inevitably is more elaborate, 
time consuming and expensive than judicial review…
[where] the case for each party can generally be set 
out in one main affidavit…supported only by relevant 
documents; rather than, as in this case, in some 16 wit-
ness statements, 15 files of documents and transcripts 
of 5 days of oral evidence249
JR is a far more expedient and inexpensive process, fac-
tors which may be of great pertinence for athletes, clubs 
and even SGBs themselves. The speed at which the sports 
industry moves makes swift dispute resolution vital for both 
participants and SGBs,250 so the availability of JR would be 
of real significance.
Of course, there are ways to expedite private law proceed-
ings. CPR changes have permanently established Shorter 
and Flexible Trials schemes,251 allowing for a “simplified” 
procedure which can offer dispute resolution “on a commer-
cial timescale”.252 These might well be appealing to sporting 
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claimants, but importantly only apply if the parties mutually 
agree. Thus, procedure could be used as a negotiating tool 
by defendant SGBs in order to draw out proceedings and 
deter litigation. There is no such opportunity for manipula-
tion in JR. Part 8 CPR proceedings might be more appealing, 
as they allow for a procedure similar to JR where there is 
no dispute of fact. However, a defendant can still object to 
its use,253 and the starting point remains that evidence will 
be heard orally and that any preliminary ruling on written 
evidence will be temporary.254
Of course, interim injunctions and declarations can be 
obtained in private law under Part 25 CPR, which offers 
swift protection where appropriate. However, such interim 
determinations tend to favour claimants, while SGBs typi-
cally fare better at trial.255 It is also unclear whether interim 
measures are available in the supervisory jurisdiction.256 A 
streamlined process of JR would avoid any such inconsisten-
cies, allowing for swift and, most importantly, final dispute 
resolution.
4.2.2  Standing
Secondly, JR’s broad test of standing257 may be of impor-
tance in the sports context. In private law, the only per-
son entitled to sue is the person whose right has been 
infringed.258 In public law, by contrast, a court will likely 
allow any applicant to proceed where they have a strong 
prospect of succeeding on the merits.259
As noted in Part 3, there is a huge public interest in sport. 
Thus, there is a strong argument for allowing challenges to 
SGBs to be made not only by the participants whose rights 
have been affected, but also interested parties more gener-
ally. Clubs are backed by passionate fans, athletes are rep-
resented by unions,260 and both are often supported com-
mercially. In cases where athletes or clubs cannot afford, 
or choose not to mount a legal challenge, such groups may 
wish to. This was the central issue in Finnigan v NZRFU 
where individuals not in a contractual relationship with the 
SGB were held to have standing, paving the way for JR of 
SGBs in New Zealand. These groups can be considered to 
have an interest in SGB decisions and would be best placed 
to vindicate that through JR.
4.2.3  Time limits
Finally, it is worth commenting on the 3-month limitation 
period in JR.261 This short time limit would be no object in 
the sports context, as urgency is invariably essential262 due 
to the fast-moving nature of the industry. Indeed, where it is 
a sporting suspension being challenged, claims will need to 
be made almost immediately.
4.2.4  Procedural assessment
Given the foregoing, it is submitted that private law rem-
edies will not always be adequate for challenging SGBs. 
The more straightforward procedural requirements of JR 
are particularly well suited to the sports sector, where dis-
putes “arise at short notice…[and] where the swiftness of 
the court’s ruling is as important as the result itself”263 and 
where interested parties might not have private law standing. 
JR can provide a final ruling within weeks or even days of 
the challenged decision.264 JR is arguably the “preferable 
vehicle” for sports dispute resolution.265
However, it must be acknowledged that it is a scarce 
resource. Unlike claims in private law, which can in theory 
be presented in any county court, there are only five admin-
istrative courts to handle JR claims nation-wide. As such, 
delays are common, somewhat offsetting the procedural 
advantages. Nonetheless, the lower-cost and conclusive 
nature of JR remains significant, and applications can be 
heard more swiftly in urgent cases.266 In the situation where 
an SGB makes an unlawful decision late one evening prohib-
iting an individual from competing the following morning, 
JR could provide an effective remedy.
4.3  Arbitration
The role of private law in sport cannot be adequately con-
sidered without mention of arbitration. The past two dec-
ades have seen arbitration emerge as the primary means of 
dispute resolution for many SGBs and, certainly, for doping 
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disputes. As such, it might be thought that the role JR would 
play would be merely residual and that arbitration clauses 
will pose an insurmountable hurdle to any challenge in the 
ordinary courts, in private or public law.267 This may be 
true in some cases, but it does not preclude the need for JR.
Firstly, not all SGBs use arbitration. For example, the 
RFU and, indeed, World Rugby (rugby union’s international 
governing body, which is governed by English law268) make 
no provision for arbitration outside of anti-doping, while 
British Cycling provides for it on a purely voluntary basis. 
As such, there will remain circumstances in which arbitra-
tion is irrelevant, and the ordinary courts’ jurisdiction will 
be the only forum for challenges to SGBs.
Secondly, the validity of “forced arbitration” clauses con-
tained in SGB regulations has been cast into doubt by the 
ECtHR decision in Mutu and Pechstein,269 which recognised 
the lack of genuine consent by participants to SGB regula-
tions. This reinforces the analysis in Part 3.1.1 with regard 
to the artificiality of the contract deemed to exist between 
participants and SGBs and may lay the foundation for a 
future challenge to the validity of SGB arbitration clauses 
in English law. Moreover, it is suggested that, if JR of SGBs 
is accepted, the administrative courts might be more willing 
to find arbitration clauses invalid, owing to their approach 
to ouster clauses.270
Arbitration has and will continue to have a significant 
role to play in sports dispute resolution, and there are many 
good reasons for that. However, it is argued that it does not 
do away with the need for, nor does it preclude, JR.
4.4  Overall assessment
In sum, it is argued that the availability of private law reme-
dies should not preclude claims for JR, as they are not neces-
sarily adequate, substantively or procedurally. Allowing JR 
of SGBs would bring the advantages of both coherence and 
speed.271 The choice of remedy should be at the discretion 
of the claimant whose rights have been infringed.
5  Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is argued that regu-
latory decisions of SGBs should be subject to JR. The rea-
soning of the decision in Aga Khan suffers from a number 
of fatal flaws undermining its authority. Its reasoning on 
the consensual relationship between participants and SGBs 
is highly unsatisfactory, and its emphasis on the source of 
the power is inappropriate. The exclusion of SGBs from the 
scope of JR is also out of line with other jurisdictions as 
well as English authorities on other self-regulatory organisa-
tions. Most significantly, since the early 1990s, government 
involvement in sport has grown inexorably such that SGBs’ 
public function can now be straightforwardly established. 
In 1991, Rose J considered that allowing JR of SGBs would 
be “a quantum leap”.272 In 2019, continuing to deny JR of 
SGBs would be a categorical mistake.
Of course, there will still be sports cases that can be dealt 
with in private law, and it is not suggested that JR be used 
exclusively. However, the availability of private law reme-
dies should not preclude JR, particularly as it will often offer 
a more appealing remedy, and, if an application is brought 
properly, there is no reason for it to be denied. New Zea-
land’s approach should be followed.
Finally, the analysis in Part 4.1 demonstrates the substan-
tive overlap between the traditionally conceived fields of 
public and private law. The position of SGBs, and their more 
recent treatment by English courts, supports the view273 
that any substantive divide between the two spheres is not 
strict. The principal divide appears procedural. Though this, 
too, has been softened, significant procedural distinctions 
do exist and, for as long as that remains the case, sport-
ing claimants should be able to challenge SGBs in both 
jurisdictions.
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